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NOTES
showing of unconscionable or inequitable conduct by the lender toward the
party seeking to avoid enforcement.
(5) The exercise of an option to accelerate under an escalation clause is
inherently valid as an enforceable contract right; further, such an exercise
need meet no test of "reasonableness."' ' 0 9
It is hoped that the Oklahoma Supreme Court will recognize the
advantages to be gained (and the problems to be avoided) by adopting the
above principles. The citizens of this state, and perhaps especially the com-
munity of potential borrowers, stand to gain as much as the institutional
lender from favorable treatment of due-on-sale clauses.
Thomas A. Creekmore III
Oil and Gas: Ownership and Use of Abandoned
Oil Well Casing When the Surface and Mineral
Estates Have Been Severed
Upon termination or abandonment of an oil and gas lease,' where the
lessee previously has drilled an oil well, the lessee has the right to remove his
drilling equipment from the premises. The extent of this right is determined
by a removal of equipment clause in the lease2 or, in the absence of such a
clause, by the law relating to trade fixtures, which permits the lessee to
remove equipment within a reasonable time after the lease terminates.3 The
oil well casing itself is regarded as part of the lessee's equipment. It is com-
posed of the wide diameter surface casing, which, by law, must extend below
the water table, and the narrower production casing, which usually extends
the depth of the well bore." The oil and gas lessee is under no obligation to
"I Lenders will obviously want to protect their interests by using escalation language in
conjunction with a due-on-sale clause.
, An oil and gas lease may terminate for a number of reasons including failure to make
timely payment of delay rentals or shut in royalties, cessation of production, or lack of produc-
tion when the lease term expires. Perhaps the most common cause of termination occurs when
the producing formation has been exhausted and drilling to a deeper oil-bearing formation is at
the time unprofitable.
2 4 E. KuNTz, OIL AND GAS § 50.3(d) (1972) [hereinafter cited as KuNTz]: "The most
common form of the removal of equipment clause extends to the lessee the right to remove
equipment 'at any time'." However, this phrase "has been construed to mean within a
reasonable time after termination or abandonment of the lease." "What constitutes a reasonable
time is determined in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances and is not determined by
the passage of time alone."
3 Id.
Okla. Corp. Comm'n: Oil & Gas Rules, R. 3-206(b) (1980): "Suitable and sufficient
surface casing or a stage collar shall be installed to a depth of at least 50 feet below the surface
or a depth of 50 feet below all fresh water strata encountered in the well, whichever is deeper...."
See also Note, The Expanding Liability for the Improper Plugging of Oil and Gas Wells in
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pull the casing, and frequently, after the lease is terminated or abandoned,
the lessee will either by intent or by omission fail to exercise his right to
remove the casing from the premises within a reasonable time. Consequently,
the lessee loses his right in the casing.-
If this occurs and the mineral and surface estates previously have been
severed, the surface owner and the mineral owner may question who has the
right to salvage value of the casing. Furthermore, if the casing is never
salvaged, they may question who has the right to its use. The surface owner
may wish to utilize the surface casing as a water well. (This can be ac-
complished by plugging the well just below a fresh water formation and per-
forating the casing in the water-bearing zone.) The mineral owner may have
granted a new oil and gas lease and the new lessee may wish to re-enter and
rework the old well, using the abandoned casing in drilling to a deeper oil-
bearing formation which, at current crude oil prices, now would be pro-
fitable to produce. The possibility of using the bore for waterflood opera-
tions also exists if the lessee has other oil wells on the same tract or unit.
No jurisdiction has addressed this issue. However, Oklahoma case law
states that oil well casing left embedded in the ground is a trade fixture that,
after the lessee's reasonable time of removal has elapsed, becomes part of the
realty, thus vesting title in the "landowner." '6 The question of who is a
"landowner" remains unresolved, at least in determining ownership of cas-
ing when the mineral and surface interests are severed.
The first part of this note will examine Oklahoma law and the nature of
the two severed interests in an attempt to determine where title to the casing
(and consequently the rights to its salvage value) should vest. Of more im-
portance, however, is the situation where the casing has been left in the
ground, the surface owner is using it as a water well, and the mineral owner
now wishes to use the bore to drill to a deeper formation. Can the mineral
owner require the surface owner to provide him the exclusive use of the well?
Conversely, does the surface owner have the right to charge a fee for the use
of the hole and casing by a new oil and gas lessee?
Although no oil and gas cases address this point, an analogy may be
made to mining law, where similar cases have arisen regarding the severed
mineral interest's ownership of coal tunnels.' It has been held that as long as
Oklahoma, 29 OKLA. L. Rv. 763 (1976). Surface casing is set and cemented in place and pro-
vides protection for fresh water formations above the producing zone. It also prevents loose
shale and sand or gravel from falling into the hole and affords a means for controlling the flow
of fluid from the well. Setting depths may vary from 500 feet to 5,000 feet. The production cas-
ing is set either near or completely through the potential pay zone. FUNDAMENTALS OF
PETROLEUM 134-35 (2d ed. 1981). Depending upon the quality and weight of the casing, the cost
of casing today ranges approximately from $15 to $25 per foot of production casing, and from
$20 to $45 per foot of surface casing. Although used and reconditioned casing usually sells at
new equipment prices, it is worth substantially less in the ground because of high salvage costs.
Garr-Woolley v. Martin, 579 P.2d 206 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978). See also 4 KUNTz, supra
note 2, § 50.3(e) (1972).
6 Garr-Woolley v. Martin, 579 P.2d 206 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
Moore v. Indian Camp Coal Co., 75 Ohio St. 493, 80 N.E. 6 (1907); Kormuth v.
United States Steel Co., 379 Pa. 365, 108 A.2d 907 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 911 (1955);
[Vol. 34
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the coal seam has not been exhausted, the mineral owner owns the
passageways that he or his grantees have excavated. 8 This analogy supports
the second part of this note, which advocates that the application of a similar
policy in oil and gas law is not only appropriate but also consistent with well-
established laws regarding the frequent rivalry between surface and mineral
interests. 9
Technological Considerations
Most states have statutes requiring plugging of abandoned oil wells."0
Lessees, however, are reluctant to plug wells because old wells may be
valuable to a new operator or may become valuable for secondary or tertiary
recovery projects." Thus, the original lessee may plug his well only to the
extent necessary to prevent seepage of oil or gas from the bottom of the well.
This is significant because a new lessee easily can drill out a partial plug, but
it is impractical in most circumstances to drill out a complete plug. However,
if the casing is pulled for its salvage value, this usually cannot be accomplished
without exploding the casing in the bottom of the hole away from the cement
plug. If the casing is so removed, the well bore will be destroyed."
Salvage Rights
In Garr-Woolley v. Martin,3 the Oklahoma Court of Appeals held that
an oil and gas lessee forfeits casing left in the ground beyond a reasonable
time for removal. The casing thus becomes part of the realty and title vests in
the owner of the fee.'I This conclusion also was reached by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit in Gutierrez v. Davis." The courtxeasoned that
oil well casings are trade fixtures'6 and, as objects embedded in the land, are
by statutory definition real property belonging to the "landowner.""'
Webber v. Vogel, 189 Pa. 156, 42 A. 4 (1899); Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 143 Pa. 293,
22 A. 1035 (1891).
' See cases cited in note 7 supra. But see Clayborn v. Camilla Red Ash Coal Co., 128
Va. 383, 105 S.E. 117 (1920).
For a recent comprehensive discussion of the relationship between oil and gas lessees
and surface owners, see Gray, A New Appraisal of the Rights of Lessees Under Oil and Gas
Leases to Use and Occupy the Surface, 20 RocKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 227 (1975). This articlealso
contains an exhaustive list of other articles, comments, and notes addressing the same subject.
id. at 228-29 nn.3, 4, & 5.
10 Douglass, The Obligations of Lessees and Others to Plug and Abandon Oil and Gas
Wells, 25 OIL & GAs INsT. 123, 138 (1974). In Oklahoma, see Okla. Corp. Comm'n: Oil & Gas
Rules, R. 3-400 through 3-409 (1980).
Douglass, supra note 9, at 145.
"Eubank v. Twin Mountain Oil Corp. 406 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
13 579 P.2d 206 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
14 Id. at 208.
" 618 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1980).
" Id. at 702, citing Luttrell v. Parker Drilling Co., 341 P.2d 244, 246 (Okla. 1959).
' Id. at 702, citing Garr-Woolley v. Martin, 579 P.2d 206 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978), and 60
OKLA. STAT. §§ 5, 7 (1971).
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In both cases, the "landowner" owned the entire fee. However, where
the surface and mineral estates are severed, it is still possible to determine
who owns the casing. Oklahoma authority indicates that the mineral owner
has only a profit a prendre (an incorporeal hereditament) and does not own
any of the oil and gas in place." In jurisdictions adopting the theory of
"ownership in place," the mineral owner owns only the oil and gas below the
surface and does not own the containing strata. 9 Therefore, if the reasoning
presented in Garr-Woolley and Gutierrez is applied along with the principles
of Oklahoma property law, the surface owner, who owns all of the soil below
the surface, also owns the abandoned casing since by operation of law, it
becomes real property.
Right To Use the Casing in the Ground
Oklahoma Law
While Gutierrez aids in determining who owns abandoned casing, the
principal question in that case was whether a lessor, who owned both the sur-
face and mineral estates, could maintain a conversion action against lessees
who drilled through a concrete plug in the casing of an abandoned oil well
and who, after failing to find oil, replugged the hole without either removing
or harming any part of the casing.2° Relying upon Oklahoma case law, which
holds that the tort of conversion will lie only for wrongful deprivation of per-
sonal property,' the court found the rule also would apply to deny an action
for conversion of fixtures (oil well casing) not severed from the real estate.22
Furthermore, the defendant's lease gave him the right to use the land for
"the purpose of exploring . . . mining and operating for oil" and other
minerals.23 The court construed this provision to give the lessee "the right to
drill through any part of the real estate including the plug and casing of the
abandoned well" when it was a reasonable use within the stated purpose." In
Gutierrez, the court awarded no damages because: (1) a conversion action in
Oklahoma applies only to personal property, whereas the casing was real
property; (2) the lessee left the casing in the same condition as he found it;
and, (3) the mineral lease conferred upon the lessee the right to drill through
any part of the real estate, including the plug and casing, if it was a
11 1 KtiNrz, supra note 2, § 2.4 (1962) (Oklahoma adheres to the "exclusive right to
take" theory of ownership).
9 Id.
20 Gutierrez v. Davis, 618 F.2d 700, 701-702 (10th Cir. 1980).
22 Id. at 702, citing Davidson v. First State Bank & Trust Co., Yale, 559 P.2d 1228, 1231
(Okla. 1976); Benton v. Ortenberger, 371 P.2d 715, 716 (Okla. 1962).
22 Id., citing Etchen v. Ferguson, 59 Okla. 253, 159 P. 306, 308 (1916).
23 Id.
24 See also 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS Lw § 222 at 333 (1980): "We urge...
adoption of the view that the mineral severance should be construed as granting exclusive rights
to subterranean strata for all purposes relating to minerals ... absent contrary language in the




reasonable use of the surface.2" A broad interpretation would permit a
mineral owner or his lessee to use abandoned casing in place with no finan-
cial obligation to the surface owner.
However, Gutierrez does not address situations in which the surface
owner wishes to exercise his rights of ownership in the casing at the same
time the mineral owner or his lessee wishes to drill. Then, two questions
arise: whether the surface owner can charge the lessee for his use of the cas-
ing and whether he can deny the lessee use of the casing in order to pull it for
the salvage value, thus destroying the bore.
Principles of Mining Law Applied To Oil and Gas Law
A similar situation frequently arises in mining law when the surface
owner attempts to prohibit the mineral owner from using previously ex-
cavatedtunnel passages for transporting coal from adjoining tracts. This
situation bears such a strong resemblance to the abandoned casing problem
as to be analogous.
In coal mining the severed mineral owner traditionally owns a bed or a
seam of coal. Unlike oil and gas, coal is not a fugitive substance. The quan-
tity and location of coal in a seam therefore reasonably can be ascertained
for conveyance purposes. 6 The mineral owner has a fee simple in the coal
seam, determinable only upon complete exhaustion of the seam. "7 Where
there are no restrictions, reservations, or exceptions in the grant creating the
mineral interest, the space left by removal of coal and by removal of as much
surrounding strata as reasonably may be required for the mining operation
remains the mine owner's property until exhaustion of the seam. It may be
used by him as he sees fit, provided no unnecessary surface injury results. "
When the seam is exhausted, the space the coal occupied reverts to the owner
of the surface by operation of law.2 9 If these principles are applied to oil and
gas law, the mineral owner would be able to assert a right to use the space in
existing wells, which he or his lessees have created, to recover oil and gas
from the land.
While this analogy appears to be consistent with regard to mining law
and oil and gas law, it should not be applied without a showing of com-
patibility and consistency in the property principles underlying each area.
That is, the reason courts allow the coal owner's ownership of underground
passageways must also serve as the proper reason for allowing the oil and gas
owner to use existing wells. Upon such a showing, courts should encounter
little difficulty in applying mining principles to oil and gas law.
1, Id. at 701-702. But see Biggs v. Tallent, 539 S.W.2d 288 (Ky. 1976).
26 Coal seams vary in width from several inches to several feet. The width of a seam
varies with each formation and is limited by rock walls on each side. Coal seams also vary in
length. 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 3(b) (1948).
27 Id. § 162(a).
" Moore v. Indian Camp Coal Co., 75 Ohio St. 493, 80 N.E. 6 (1907).
29 Id.
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Most mining decisions considering ownership of underground
passageways revolve around the mineral owner's right to use the passageways
to transport coal from adjacent mines under different lands wherein the
mineral owner owns additional mineral rights. The first and leading
American case addressing this issue is Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co.,30
decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1891. The mineral owner had
carved out a passageway 200 feet below the surface through and completely
contained by his vein of coal. He used the tunnel to transport coal from his
mines underlying nearby lands and to bring coal to the surface on adjacent
lands he also owned. The court rejected the surface owner's contention that
the fee in such spaces remained with the surface estate subject merely to an
easement for removal of minerals. Instead, it held that the mineral owner, in
addition to owning the coal seam, also owns the spaces left by removal of
coal and, so long as specific damage to the surface is not caused, he may use
such spaces for any purposes he sees fit." Since the coal in the seam is a cor-
poreal substance, the court reasoned, the mineral owner had a fee simple in
the seam that was determinable upon exhaustion. Accordingly, since the
mineral owner owned the coal in place in fee, he also owned the space left by
removal of the coal.
32
The Pennsylvania court's reasoning in Lillibridge was followed in
Moore v. Indian Camp Coal Co.,13 wherein the Ohio Supreme Court held
that it would be illogical, impracticable, and unjust to rule that the empty
space created by removal of coal reverts to the surface owner as soon as the
coal is removed. 3 In relation to oil and gas law, the most significant aspect
of Moore deals with actual excavations made by the mineral owner in mining
his coal. The coal seam averaged only four feet in width, and the mineral
owner had to remove some of the containing strata to create necessary head-
way for working the mine.3 The court found he owned the passageway and
could use it in transporting coal from other lands, even though the passage
was not, strictly speaking, space remaining after removal of coal.36 The court
reasoned that the grant of a fee simple determinable estate in a mineral
"necessarily implies the right to use or remove such portions of the contain-
ing strata as may be necessary or proper for the convenient and proper
removal of the mineral itself" with, of course, regard for the surface owner's
right of subjacent support.
37
31 143 Pa. 293, 22 A. 1035 (1891).
1 Id. at 308, 22 A. at 1037-39. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted its
acceptance of this rule in deciding a federal district case from Oklahoma. Sharum v. Whitehead
Coal Mining Co., 223 F. 282, 290 (8th Cir. 1915).
312 Id. at 301, 22 A. at 1036-37.
31 75 Ohio St. 493, 80 N.E. 6 (1907).
14 Id. al 500, 80 N.E. at 8.
Id., 80 N.E. at 7.
Id. at 500-501, 80 N.E. at 8.




In Kormuth v. United States Steel Co.,38 the mineral owner owned a
coal seam that undulated so sharply that for a short segment the owner had
to deviate from the seam for the purpose of constructing a haulage road of a
uniform and safe grade." Rejecting the surface owner's contention that this
was not, strictly speaking, a space made by removal of coal, the court held
that the deviation was "a proper exercise of right and one that was necessar-
ily contemplated by the very purposes of the grant.""0 The court further
declared that the mineral owner did no more than was customary, proper,
and necessary for mining and removing coal and constructing a haulage
way.
41
The Pennsylvania court in Lillibridge2 narrowly based its decision on
the fact that the mineral owner's interest was a corporeal hereditament, that
is, the mineral was actually owned in place. However, Moore'3 and
Kormuth,44 in following the Lillibridge doctrine, relied on the implied rights
of mineral owners in determining ownership of tunnel space. The two cases
hold that when removal of strata is necessary for convenient and proper
removal of the mineral itself, the resulting space will belong to the mineral
owner. 4s The removal of strata resulting from drilling for oil is necessary for
convenient and proper removal of oil. With respect to jurisdictions in which
ownership of oil and gas is recognized as a corporeal hereditament, an appli-
cation of the foregoing mining principles would indicate that both the space
in the well bore created by the drilling process and the casing that holds the
bore intact would be available for the mineral owner's use in additional drill-
ing or in secondary recovery operations.4 The West Virginia Supreme Court
addressed the mining law analogy in Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co.47 In that
case, the plaintiff surface owner sought an injunction against the defendant
mineral owner's use of a limestone stratum for gas storage. The mineral
owner attempted to make an analogy, similar to that set out in this note, with
regard to his use of the stratum. He was unsuccessful, though, because, ac-
cording to the pleadings, the stratum had been completely exhausted. The
" 379 Pa. 365, 108 A.2d 907 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 911 (1955).
09 Id. at 373, 108 A.2d at 911.
40 Id.
41 Id.
11 Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 193 Pa. 293, 22 A. 1035 (1891).
41 Moore v. Indiana Camp Coal Co., 75 Ohio St. 493, 80 N.E. 6 (1907).
11 Kormuth v. United States Steel Co., 379 Pa. 365, 108 A.2d 907 (1954), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 911 (1955).
11 See text accompanying notes 28-41 supra.
46 The proposed analogy seems to draw partial support, at least in principle, from Pro-
fessor Kuntz, who believes that it is apparent that exhausted sands and cavities created by the ex-
traction of oil and gas may be utilized by the mineral owner in the process of removing any
recoverable minerals. He states: "[olwners engaged in secondary recovery operations make such
assumption." 1 KuNwz, supra note 2, § 2.6 (1962).
47 137 W. Va. 272, 71 S.E.2d 65 (1952). See also Comment, 55 W. VA. L. Rav. 72
(1952-53).
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West Virginia court, however, did not reject the analogy nor its theoretical
basis, intimating that in a more appropriate factual situation the analogy in-
deed would be applicable.48
Theories of Ownership
Conflicting theories of ownership of oil and gas 9 may pose difficulties
in analogizing mining law to oil and gas law. The ownership of oil and gas in
place is conceptually compatible with the ownership of solid minerals. Both
are considered corporeal hereditaments. Jurisdictions treating ownership of
oil and gas as a corporeal hereditament thus will be able to apply the anqlogy
on a theoretical basis, if not on a practical one.
In nonownership jurisdictions, such as Oklahoma, where the mineral
interest is considered a profit a prendre, the analogy also may be supported.
In Clayborn v. Camilla Red Ash Coal Co.," the court rejected the majority
rule which accords the mineral owner the right to use underground
passageways opened by removal of granted minerals in transporting other
minerals from adjacent tracts. The court held that although the mineral
grantee had a corporeal interest in the coal seam, he never had such an estate
in the containing walls." However, the conveyance carried the "necessary in-
cidental easement to use the containing walls for support and for the purpose
of getting it out, just as it carries the right to sink a shaft or drive an opening
when necessary upon and through the surface to reach and remove the
coal." 2 So long as the granted coal seam was not exhausted, the mineral
11 Id. at 282, 71 S.E.2d at 71. "The case of Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co.... has
been substantially limited by subsequent decisions to the effect that so long as there remain
recoverable minerals which are mined in good faith, the space may be used by the owner of the
minerals .... An entirely different factual situation is presented . . . in this case .... [Tihe
allegations of the bill of complaint, being treated as true, are to the effect that there are no
recoverable minerals in the Big Lime stratum. Under the rule of the cases cited, we do not think
the individual defendants ... have a right to use the space in the Big Lime stratum, if any such
space exists." Id. But cf. Emeny v. United States, 412 F.2d 1319 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
' According to Professor Kuntz, theories of ownership represent little more than accept-
able methods of describing ownership in light of the law of capture. Two theories of ownership
of oil and gas exist. They are: "ownership in place" and "exclusive right to take." The two
theories may also be referred to as the "ownership" and "nonownership" theories. (However,
"nonownership" does not indicate the absence of property rights.)
Professor Kuntz explains the distinction thus: "According to the ownership-in-place
theory, the landowner owns all substances, including oil and gas, which underlie his land. Such
ownership is qualified, however, in the case of oil and gas, by the operation of the law of cap-
ture. If the oil and gas depart from beneath the owned land, ownership in such substances is
lost.
"According to the exclusive-right-to-take theory, the landowner does not own the oil and
gas which underlie his land. He merely has the exclusive right to capture such substances by
operations on his land. Once reduced to dominion and control, such substances become the ob-
ject of absolute ownership, but, until capture, the property right is described as an exclusive
right to capture." 4 KurNrz, supra note 2, § 2.4.
128 Va. 383, 105 S.E. 117 (1920).





owner possessed an easement of way through and support of the granted
coal.
The rule stated in Clayborn that the mineral owner has an absolute
right to use spaces he has created, so long as he mines his own coal, is
applied easily to the owner of a profit a prendre in oil and gas. He should be
able to use and control spaces created by drilling for oil and gas as long as he
owns the mineral fee. The ability to exercise this right necessarily implies that
the casing must be left in place in the well bore.
Practical Applications
The foregoing discussion can be helpful to the mineral owner and his
lessee in three situations. 3 The first situation exists when the surface owner is
willing to leave the casing in the bore so that it can be reused in drilling but
also wishes to charge the mineral owner for its use. If the mineral owner's
rights are such that the space in the well bore must be preserved, he cannot
be charged for use of the casing. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in Gutierrez v. Davis," stated that the lessee's use of aban-
doned casing is a reasonable use of the surface where such right is implied in
the oil and gas lease. If this is so, the lessee's use of the casing can be equated
with his implied right to reasonable use of the surface owner's water and to
as much of the surface owner's land as is necessary to maintain a drill site.
Because the lessee is not required to pay the surface owner for these uses, he
should not be required to pay the surface owner for use of the casing.
The second situation occurs when the surface owner decides to pull the
casing for its salvage value just as the mineral owner is about to commence
drilling operations. In that instance, the mineral owner might want to enjoin
the surface owner from pulling the casing. An application of the analogy
could support an injunction.
A third situation arises where the mineral owner wants to drill through
the casing but the surface owner already has put it to use, for example, as a
water well. A solution lies in working out an accommodation which preserves
for the severed mineral owner or his lessee a reasonable dominant easement
for the production of minerals, while at the same time preserving a viable ser-
vient estate." A case in point is Getty Oil Co. v. Jones.16 In 1955 plaintiff
Jones bought a large tract of land that was subject to prior mineral interests
"1 Since the rights of the oil and gas lessee derive from those of the mineral owner, the
above arguments will apply with equal force in favor of the lessee should he be involved in a
dispute with the surface owner.
618 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1980).
" Paraphrasing a portion of Justice Daniel's dissent, Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483
S.W.2d 808, 817 (Tex. 1972).
16 470 S.W.2d 618 (rex. 1971), aff'd on reh., 470 S.W.2d 627. See also Note, Deter-
mination Whether A Land Use By A Mineral Lessee Is Reasonably Necessary Requires Con-
sideration Of Alternate Methods Of Development Available to a Lessee And A Surface Owner,
50. TEx. L. REv. 806 (1972).
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in which he acquired no interest. Jones used the land primarily for
agricultural purposes and, in later years, installed a large pivotal sprinkler
system. In 1967, Getty drilled two wells upon which it had to install two
beam-type pumping units to maintain production. The upstroke of these
units was so high as to preclude the use of Jones's pivotal irrigation system in
the area of the two wells. Jones sought to enjoin Getty from operating the
pumps. The court ruled that the oil and gas estate is the dominant estate in
the sense that use of as much of the premises as is reasonably necessary to
produce and remove the minerals is impliedly authorized by the lease, but
these rights are to be exercised with "due regard" for the rights of the owner
of the servient estate." The court pointed out, however, that due regard is
not to be measured by the degree of harm or inconvenience to the landowner.
Rather, there must be a determination of whether, under all the cir-
cumstances, the manner of surface use is reasonably necessary. The burden is
upon the surface owner to prove unreasonable use." It has been observed
that this includes the burden of establishing the availability to the lessee of a
feasible alternative use, and possibly also the lack of an available alternative
for the surface owner's proposed activity. 9 Because it was economically
practicable for Getty to install its pumping units in cement cellars, lowering
their height and permitting the sprinklers to move freely, the court required
Getty to do so, holding this was a reasonable alternative to Getty's present
use of the surface. The court thought that this compromise would serve the
public policy in favor of developing mineral resources while simultaneously
permitting the utilization of the surface for productive agricultural uses.6 0
Getty principally dealt with the relationship between a surface owner
and a mineral lessee, and has been viewed as creating an independent duty
owed to the surface owner by the lessee, the breach of which could support
an action for damages. 6 1 The court's decision, however, is more correctly
characterized as one seeking a reasonable accommodation of the mineral and
surface estates that acknowledges the dominance of the mineral estate by
placing on the surface owner the burden of proving unreasonable use of the
surface. 62 In applying this principle, it is logical that a mineral owner should
,1 470 :.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971). See also Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 511
S.W.2d 160 (Ark. 1974); Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 817 (Tex. 1972); Ottis v.
Haas, 569 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Winslow v. Duval County Ranch Co., 519 S.W.2d
217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
470 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Tex. 1971), aff'd on reh., 470 S.W.2d 627.
Gray, A New Appraisal of the Rights of Lessees Under Oil and Gas Leases to Use and
Occupy the Surface, 20 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 227, 261 (1975).
60 470 S.W.2d 618, 622-23 (Tex. 1971).
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have the right to use the abandoned casing as long as the surface owner's
rights are preserved. If the surface owner is currently using the abandoned
surface casing as a water well, the mineral owner should be allowed to drain
the well for his use in recovering oil if he is willing to drill another water well
nearby for the surface owner's use. In such an arrangement, the surface
owner suffers no loss and the public policy of developing mineral resources is
preserved.
Conclusion
The reasoning in this note can be simply stated. If an oil and gas lessee
fails to remove embedded oil well casing from a terminated or abandoned
lease, the casing is forfeited and title thereto vests in the owner of the fee. In
Oklahoma, this result is reached because casing is regarded as a trade fixture
which, when abandoned, becomes part of the real estate. When the surface
and mineral estates are severed, the surface owner takes title to the casing
because he owns all the strata below the surface subject to the mineral
owner's right to extract oil and gas from the fee.
The surface owner thus has the right to pull the casing for its salvage
value. However, if the mineral owner or his new lessee wishes to use the
abandoned well bore and casing in new oil and gas recovery operations
without being charged for the use, two theories can be applied to enjoin the
surface owner from removing the casing or from charging the mineral owner
or his lessee for the use of the casing.
First, according to Gutierrez v. Davis,63 the mineral lessee, in drilling
for oil and gas, has, by the implied terms of the lease, the right to reasonable
use of the surface including the abandoned casing, which by operation of law
is a part of the realty. Gutierrez indicates that the surface owner cannot
charge the lessee where he has made a reasonable use of the casing.
Second, an analogy can be drawn between mining law and oil and gas
law. By drawing such an analogy, the owner of oil and gas in jurisdictions
where such ownership is regarded as a corporeal hereditament also would
have a fee simple in the spaces left by the removal of the mineral itself or by
the removal of containing strata that is necessary for the proper and conven-
ient extraction of the oil and gas. If the abandoned well bore is preserved by
the presence of casing, ownership of the space in the bore necessarily implies
the right to keep the casing in the well so that the space may be preserved. It
follows, then, that an oil and gas lessee could rightfully refuse to pay the
severed surface owner for the use of the casing; and based on the mineral in-
terest's ownership of the space created by previous drilling, the lessee should
be able to enjoin the removal of the casing where he can show that doing so
might cause the bore to collapse.
sought to prevent the mineral lessees from conducting seismic exploration activities on his prop-
erty. Somewhat contrary to Getty, the court stated, "Where alternatives do exist, however, the
concepts of due regard and reasonable necessity do require a weighing of the different alter-
natives against the inconvenience to the surface owner." Id. at 137.
63 618 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1980).
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Because of conceptual, and theoretical restrictions, in jurisdictions
where the oil and gas owner is regarded as owning an incorporeal heredita-
ment, or profit a prendre, ownership of space in the well bore conceptually
cannot be concluded by analogizing to mining law. However, in Clayborn v.
Camilla Red Ash Coal Co.,64 the court reasoned that a coal seam owner has
an implied grant of easement through containing strata where the removal of
strata in recovering the mineral is necessary. The reasoning in Clayborn does
not contradict the majority rule in mining law insofar as the mineral owner's
exclusive right to use his underground passageways in recovering minerals
under the surface owner's tract. For this reason, the rule in Clayborn can be
analogized to oil and gas law, where the mineral owner has a profit a pendre.
Clayborn supports the proposition that the oil and gas owner'has an implied
grant of easement through the spaces he or his lessees have created as long as
he owns the right to produce oil and gas on the tract in question. Thus, the
surface owner cannot pull the casing, thereby destroying the bore, when such
an easement exists.
Further, where the mineral owner wishes to drill through the casing, but
the surface owner has already put the casing to use, courts should seek to at-
tain a reasonable accommodation of both estates. In this regard the oil and
gas estate is the dominant estate, but the surface rights implied in favor of
the mineral estate are to be exercised with "due regard" for the rights of the
owner of the servient estate. This principle can be followed by allowing the
mineral owner to use the casing as long as he accommodates the servient
estate by providing a reasonable alternative for the surface owner's current
use of the casing.
Jeffrey R. Akins
" 128 Va. 383, 105 S.E. 117 (1920).
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